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Abstract
With recent growing concerns about data privacy, researchers have focused
their attention to developing new algorithms to perform privacy preserving
data mining. However, methods proposed until now are either very inefficient
to deal with large datasets, or compromise privacy with accuracy of data
mining results.
Secure multiparty computation helps researchers develop privacy preserv-
ing data mining algorithms without having to compromise quality of data
mining results with data privacy. Also it provides formal guarantees about
privacy. On the other hand, algorithms based on secure multiparty computa-
tion often rely on computationally expensive cryptographic operations, thus
making them infeasible to use in real world scenarios.
In this thesis, we study the problem of privacy preserving distributed
clustering and propose an efficient and secure algorithm for this problem
based on secret sharing and compare it to the state of the art. Experiments
show that our algorithm has a lower communication overhead and a much
lower computation overhead than the state of the art.
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Verimli Mahremiyeti Koruyan Dagˇıtık Ku¨meleme
Mahir Can Dogˇanay
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendisligˇi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi 2008
Tez Danıs¸manı: Yu¨cel Saygın
Anahtar Kelimeler : Mahremiyeti Koruyan Veri Madenciligˇi, Ku¨meleme,
Gu¨venli C¸ok Partili Hesaplama, Paylas¸ımlı S¸ifreleme
O¨zet
I˙nsanların son yıllarda artan mahremiyet kaygıları veri madenciligˇi alanında
c¸alıs¸an aras¸tırmacıları mahremiyeti koruyan veri madenciligˇi algoritmaları
gelis¸tirmeye zorluyor. Ancak s¸u ana kadar ortaya atılan algoritmalar ya c¸ok
bu¨yu¨k veri yıgˇınları u¨zerinde etkisiz kalmakta, ya da insanları mahremiyet
ve sonuc¸ kalitesi arasında bir sec¸im yapmaya zorlamaktadır.
Gu¨venli c¸ok partili hesaplama yo¨ntemleri veri madenciligˇi algoritmalarının
sonuc¸ kalitelerini bozmadan veri mahremiyetini korumaya imkan tanımaktadır.
Ancak gu¨venli c¸ok partili hesaplama yo¨ntemi ile gelis¸tirilmis¸ mahremiyeti
koruyan veri madenciligˇi algoritmaları, ac¸ık anahtar s¸ifreleme teknikleri kul-
lanılarak gelis¸tirilmektedir. Bu da bu algoritmaların gerc¸ek hayatta bu¨yu¨k
veri yıgˇınları u¨stu¨nde kullanılmasını imkansız kılmaktadır.
Bu tezde ac¸ık anahtar s¸ifreleme yerine paylas¸ımlı s¸ifreleme teknigˇine dayanan
bir dagˇıtık ku¨meleme algoritması o¨nerilmis¸tir. Yapılan testlere go¨re algo-
ritma s¸u ana kadar ortaya atılan eni iyi algoritmalardan c¸ok daha hızlı
c¸alıs¸makta ve partiler arası daha az veri transferi gerektirmektedir.
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1 Introduction
Data mining can best be described as the process of turning data into use-
ful knowledge. Massive amounts of data are collected for various reasons
by many organizations with the hope that data mining technology will ex-
tract useful knowledge from the collected data and turn it into something
beneficial. Data mining technology has been proven successful in numerous
applications such as business intelligence, health sciences, traffic management
and security related topics like credit card fraud detection.
However, increasing privacy concerns have begun to put large scale data
mining projects in jeopardy, largely due to the projects carried out by the
Department of Homeland Security in U.S. Privacy concerns even lead to can-
cellation of large scale projects because they failed to meet privacy concerns.
According to a recent article in Computer World by Jaikumar Vijayan “The
chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, has asked Depart-
ment of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to provide a detailed
listing of all IT programs that have been canceled, discontinued or modified
because of privacy concerns”[25]. Due to these privacy concerns, data mining
researchers have focused their attention to developing techniques that would
enable data mining while preserving the privacy of individuals and started a
popular branch of research named “privacy preserving data mining”[1].
Today, the need for efficient privacy preserving data mining methods is
more than ever. With many governmental and private institutions collect-
ing data about their clients and users, nowadays personal data about an
individual resides on several servers. In some cases, it is useful to combine
this data and perform data mining on the union of this personal data when
1
analysis of this data is of mutual interest to all data holders. In this case,
protecting privacy becomes not only the individuals’ concern, but data hold-
ers also must pay attention to protecting the indivuals’ data they posses due
to contractual obligations. Thus, there is a need for privacy preserving data
mining algorithms which can work in a distributed scenario.
Over the years, algorithms based on statistics and cryptography were
proposed for privacy preserving data mining problems such as classification,
clustering, and pattern mining that work in centralized and distributed envi-
ronments. However, privacy preserving data management in general, is still
an ongoing research topic, and efficient, as well as provably secure, methods
without strong assumptions are yet to be proposed.
In this thesis, we address privacy preserving clustering of data sets verti-
cally partitioned among multiple sites. We propose a new secure multiparty
computation based algorithm for distributed privacy preserving clustering
that is both more efficient and faster than the state of the art for this prob-
lem. As a case study we chose k-means clustering of moving object trajec-
tories to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. In this scheme, we
eliminate the computationally heavy public key encryption operations and
base our algorithm on secret sharing as the cryptographic primitive. The
main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a new and generic scheme which has lower communication
cost than state of the art up to more than 60 parties, which is reasonable
for most applications.
• We implemented and tested our scheme as well as the algorithm in [24].
Our experiments, confirm that our algorithm has significantly lower
2
computational overhead due to the fact that we replace computation-
ally expensive public key encryption operations with secret sharing.
• We demonstrate that our scheme is applicable in any clustering algo-
rithm which uses a dissimilarity matrix, such as hierarchical clustering
and k-medoids clustering.
• We apply our algorithm to clustering of moving object trajectories and
show that our algorithm is able to deal with trajectories with local time
and distance shifts.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, we focus
on the necessary background, explaining clustering and secure multiparty
computation. In section 3 we explain privacy preserving data mining and give
related work on the subject. In section 4, we explain our privacy preserving
clustering methods, explaining how it differs from state of the art. Section
5, we show how our methods preserve privacy and security, explaining its
strengths by comparing it to state of the art. In section 6, we show an in
depth computation and communication cost analysis and finally in section 7,
we give our conclusions.
3
2 Background
2.1 Clustering
Clustering is one of the most fundamental data mining problems. Clustering
can be defined as grouping a set of data objects into classes of similar objects.
A cluster is a set of data objects where an object is similar to the objects
in the same cluster and is dissimilar to the objects in other clusters. Clus-
tering has a very diverse application area, ranging from market research(e.g.
customer segmentation) to biology(e.g. finding genes with similar functional-
ity). A number of clustering algorithms have been proposed so far with new
ones still continuing to be proposed. Clustering algorithms can be roughly
divided into 3 categories.
2.1.1 Partitioning based methods
Algorithms in this group partition a set of n data objects and create k par-
titions of it where k ≤ n. The number of clusters,k, is given as a parameter
to the algorithms in this group. Given k, algorithms in this group create
an initial partitioning. Then they iteratively try to improve the quality of
the partitioning until a termination criteria is reached. K-means is a prime
example of a partitioning based clustering algorithm. Another notable ex-
ample k-medoids, very similar in terms of basic idea to k-means clustering.
The main difference between k-means and k-medoids is that in k-means an
imaginary mean object is selected as a cluster representative whereas in k-
medoids one of the actual objects in a cluster is selected as the representative
object for that cluster. This makes k-medoids more robust to outliers, yet it
4
also decreases its computational efficiency.
2.1.2 Hierarchical Clustering
Algorithms in this group create a hierarchical decomposition of the given
set data objects. Depending on how the hierarchical order is computed,
a hierarchical clustering algorithm is further classified as agglomerative or
divisive. Agglomerative approach(bottom − up) starts with putting each
data object in a group of its own and merges objects or groups of objects
that are close to one another until a termination criteria is met. Divisive
approach(top−down) is the opposite, it starts with all the data objects in one
group successively divides each group into smaller groups until it terminates.
The main problem with hierarchical clustering algorithms is that, when an
object is assigned to a false cluster, it is impossible to go back and correct it,
unlike partitioning methods. Some examples of algorithms in this category
are AGNES(AGglomerative NESting) and BIRCH.
2.1.3 Density based Clustering
While partitioning based and hierarchical clustering algorithms are based on
distance, algorithms in this group are based on the notion of density. The
general idea behind algorithms in this class is to keep growing the given
cluster as long as the density in the neighborhood of the cluster is over some
threshold. In other words, for each data object in a given cluster, there
has to be more than a minimum number of points in the cluster. Such
a method is more robust to noise and can also find clusters with arbitrary
shape. OPTICS[2] and DBSCAN[8] are two prime examples of density based
5
clustering methods.
It is very difficult to find the most effective clustering algorithm. Usually
each algorithm is tailor-made to work for a specific type of data, the choice
of the clustering algorithm that gives best results is highly problem specific.
2.2 Spatio-Temporal Clustering
In theory, all the clustering algorithms that work on numeric data can be
applied to spatio-temporal data(e.g. moving object trajectory data). How-
ever, it has been understood that when dealing with moving object trajec-
tories, treating trajectories as numerical data does not yield much success,
time attribute of moving object trajectories should be considered as well.
A regression model based algorithm by Gaffney et al.[11] considers trajec-
tories as a whole rather than as a set of points. A more recent work by
Lee,Han,Whang[18] proposed an algorithm that can detect similar portions
of trajectories that otherwise are not close to each other.
2.2.1 Trajectory Distance Measures
The difficulty of trajectory clustering is a result of the fact that the notion
of “similar trajectories” can change per application. Therefore, depending
on the notion of “similar trajectories”, appropriate distance measures should
be used. Also trajectories in real world may be of different length, they may
have different observation intervals, and trajectories may be subject to local
time and distance shifts. A distance measure should take these issues into
account. Various distance measures for trajectories have been proposed and
this topic is still an active research area.
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The naive method to compare trajectories is to use Euclidean or Manhat-
tan distances, based on comparing the corresponding location observations
of trajectories of equal length. They are also sensitive to local time shifts
and noise. However, the value they output is metric(i.e. triangle inequality
holds). Also they have a θ(n) complexity, making it very efficient for very
long trajectories.
EDR(Edit Distance on Real Sequence)[5] and LCSS(Longest Common
Subsequence)[26] are distances based on quantized penalty. They try to
match the corresponding location observations of two trajectories. Although
they are resistant to time shifts, the value they output is not metric. Also
both of them have a θ(n2) complexity.
Edit Distance with Real Penalty(ERP)[6] is a combination of Euclidean
Distance and EDR. It calculates the minimum cost of transforming one tra-
jectory to the other after finite number of operations where the cost of each
operation is the spatial shift between the corresponding location observa-
tions. It is resistant to noise, and local time shifts and it is a metric distance
measure. The complexity of ERP is θ(n2).
2.3 Secure Multiparty Computation
The Secure Multipary Computation was introduced by Yao in[28], with “mil-
lionaires problem”. In this problem, two millionaires want to compare their
wealth, but at the same time do not want to reveal the precise amount of
wealth they got. Formal definition of the problem is as follows. A number
of players (P1, P2, ..., Pn) have their private data (x1, x2, ..., xn) respectively.
They want to compute the value y = f(x1, x2, ..., xn) ,such that f is a public
7
function, so that no player can learn anything than the result of the compu-
tation and the public function f reveal. Two important building blocks of
Secure multiparty computation is homomorphic encryption and secret shar-
ing.
2.3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a type of encryption that allows us to do compu-
tation on encrypted inputs without having to decrypt the input, thus it is a
fundamental block of Secure multiparty computation. A public key encryp-
tion scheme is homomorphic with respect to a binary operator • if there is a
binary operator ∗ such that E(a) ∗E(b) = E(a • b). One example of such an
encryption scheme is Paillier public key encryption, which is homomorphic
with respect to addition. With modulus n and and base g, the encryption of
the message a will be
E(a) = garn1 mod n
2
The encryption of the message will be
E(b) = gbrn2 mod n
2
From two equations above, it follows that
E(a)E(b) = ga+b(r1r2)
n mod n2 = E(a+ b modn)
2.3.2 Secret Sharing
A (t, n) secret sharing scheme is a set of two functions S and R. The function
S is a sharing function and takes a secret s as input and creates n secret
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shares : S(s) = (s1, . . . , sn). The two functions satisfy that for any set I ⊆
{1, . . . , n} of t indices R(I, sI1 , . . . , sIt) = s. Furthermore we require that it
is impossible to recover s from a set of t− 1 secret shares. A secret sharing
scheme is additively homomorphic if R(I, sI1 + s
′
I1
, . . . , sIt + s
′
It
) = s+ s′.
A very simple (n, n) secret sharing scheme which is additively homomor-
phic is S(s) = (r1, . . . , rn−1, r), where ri is random for i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, and
r = s −∑n−1i=1 ri. To recover s all secret shares are added: s = r +∑n−1i=1 ri.
If even one secret share is missing nothing is known about s. We use this
simple additive secret sharing scheme in our algorithms in this thesis.
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3 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
Privacy preserving data mining is a relatively young research area with
around 8 years of history. Aggrawal and Srikant initiated the research on
privacy preserving data mining with their seminal paper about constructing
classifications models while preserving privacy [1]. The aim of privacy pre-
serving data mining is ensuring the privacy of the individuals is preserved
while maintaining the efficiency and accuracy of data mining algorithms. Pre-
serving privacy and performing data mining are two conflicting goals, if one
wants to perform privacy preserving data mining, he has to either sacrifice
accuracy of data mining results or computational efficiency of the algorithm.
Sometimes data mining results themselves can be in breach of privacy[14].
All the work in privacy preserving data mining field try to achieve maximum
privacy protection with minimum loss of accuracy/efficiency.
Privacy preserving data mining algorithms can be divided into two cate-
gories, (1) Random perturbation-based and (2) Secure Multiparty computa-
tion based algorithms.
3.1 Data Perturbation Based Algorithms
Perturbation techniques mix additive or multiplicative noise with the data
so that actual values in the data set are not learned, yet the data mining
results gathered from the perturbed data will not deviate significantly from
the results gathered from the original data. The work of Aggrawal and
Srikant[1] fall in this category. Another notable work in this category is
privacy preserving mining of association rules by Effimievski et. al. [9]. One
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recent significant work by Kargupta et al.[20] shows that random projection
based multiplicative data perturbation is a very efficient way to perform
privacy preserving clustering. The results obtained from perturbed data have
below 5% error rate as compared to the results obtained from the original
data.
Algorithms in this category present a very practical and efficient way of
performing privacy preserving data mining, bringing little or no computa-
tional overhead to the data mining algorithms. However, these algorithms
are based on trading accuracy of the data mining results with privacy of
individuals. In addition, while the noise added to the data may preserve one
statistical feature of the dataset, other statistical properties are likely to be
affected. Also most of these algorithms consider a centralized scenario, i.e.
cannot deal with data distributed over multiple data holders. Furthermore,
algorithms in this category do not preserve privacy in any formal sense, i.e.
one cannot easily calculate how much effort and resources are needed to filter
out the noise and breach privacy.
3.2 Secure Multiparty Computation Based Algorithms
Algorithms based on secure multiparty computation (SMC) do not have to
trade accuracy with privacy and they preserve the security and privacy of the
data of individuals in a formal way. It is well known from the SMC literature
that any Turing computable function can be computed among distributed
parties without revealing the private inputs[28, 3]. Therefore, theoretically
it is possible to perform distributed data mining without revealing data at
individual sites. However, generalized solutions to SMC problem like Yao’s
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secure circuit evaluation[28] have very high communication and computation
overhead, thus making infeasible to use in data mining problems where data
size can be hundreds of GBs. Clifton et.al.[7] proposed that data mining algo-
rithms make use of a relatively small set of primitive functions and therefore
generalized SMC algorithms for these primitive functions can be used to solve
data mining problems. However, even this solution suffers from large com-
munication and computation overheads. Therefore, specialized algorithms
should be developed for specific data mining problems.
The first privacy preserving data mining algorithm based on SMC is the
work of Lindell and Pinkas[19] on decision tree classification. This algorithm
however requires each bit of information sent between parties is encrypted,
thus has a very high communication and computation cost. Clifton and
Kantarcıogˇlu[13] proposed an algorithm for association rule mining, based on
the commutative encryption. Clifton and Vaidya[24] proposed an algorithm
for k-means clustering over vertically partitioned data with using homomor-
phic encryption. Common to all these algorithms are high computation and
communication overhead. Inan et.al. [12] give an efficient algorithm for clus-
tering over horizontally partitioned data, however it is not entirely privacy
preserving. It requires a trusted 3rd party and if any party in this algorithm
colludes with the 3rd party, he can learn every other players input.
All the algorithms above rely on public key encryption schemes, which
bring high computation overhead. This high computation overhead can be
avoided with the use of secret sharing. The use of secret sharing to perform
secure multiparty data mining gained some momentum in recent years. One
of the most notable examples is the work of Laur, Lipmaa and Mielikainen[17]
12
in which they use secret sharing for private support vector classification.
One other notable use of secret sharing in a privacy preserving data mining
algorithm is the work of Wright and Yang[27] to compute Bayesian networks
over vertically partitioned data. Similar to these works, our algorithm also
relies on secret sharing.
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4 Privacy Preserving Clustering
In this chapter, we present our privacy preserving clustering algorithms over
vertically partitioned data. First, we present our k-means clustering algo-
rithm in section 4.1 Privacy preserving k-means clustering over vertically
partitioned data has been studied in the literature by Clifton and Vaidya[24].
Here, we improve on their algorithm. Clifton and Vaidya make use of ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption which requires public key encryptions. The
public key encryptions are the bottleneck of the method described in [24].
In contrast, we use additive secret sharing to achieve privacy, which gives us
lower computation and communication overhead.
In section 4.2, we also show how our method can be used to build a
dissimilarity matrix and can be used in a clustering algorithm that takes
dissimilarity matrix as an input. In section 4.3 we explain how our method
can work with trajectories with spatial and temporal shifts.
4.1 K-means Clustering Algorithm
K-means clustering is the most prominent and widely used clustering algo-
rithm, also referred in the literature as Lloyds algorithm. The algorithm gets
a set of points in the d-dimensional space and assigns each point into one of
k clusters such that the sum of distances to the nearest center is minimized.
While the algorithm is simple and therefore efficient, it has a few drawbacks.
The drawbacks are that it is sensitive to outliers, tends to form only spherical
shaped clusters and the number of clusters, k must be provided in advance.
Our privacy-preserving clustering algorithm is an improvement of the one
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proposed by Clifton and Vaidya in [24]. The central difference is the how we
do the search for the closest cluster a given object. Another difference is that
we use secret sharing for secure compuatation of closest cluster whereas hmo-
morphic encryption is used in [24]. The power of secret sharing in this setting
is that communication and computation overhead is considerably lower. To
make our presentation clear, we simplify some parts of the algorithm, but
apply the same simplifications to [24] when we compare the efficiency of the
two algorithms in Section 6.3.
4.1.1 Problem Definition
Suppose there are R data holders, such that R ≥ 4 with each one of them
holding some attributes of the each entity in the dataset. The number of
entities in the dataset is n. The goal of the r parties is to perform k-means
clustering on their aggregated data without revealing the values of the at-
tributes they own to the other parties. At the end of the algorithm, each
entity in the dataset is assigned to one of k clusters and each party learns
the cluster means corresponding to their own attributes, and the index of
the cluster into which each entity is assigned. Ideally, no party should learn
anything other than this.
Let µc, c ∈ {1, ..., k}, represent the cluster means of the result. Let µci
be the projection of cluster mean c onto the attributes of party i (µc =
(µc1, . . . , µcr)). As output of privacy preserving k-means clustering party i
gets:
• The final mean µci for each cluster c ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
• The cluster index for each entity j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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Each data holder involved in the algorithm is assumed to be semi-honest,
meaning each data holder will follow the algorithm as expected, but may
store any information he receives during the execution of the algorithm.
The algorithm starts with choosing initial cluster means, then all entities
in the dataset are assigned to the closest initial clusters. After the initial
assignment of clusters, the cluster means are recalculated and each entity is
reassigned to the cluster with the closest cluster mean. The process continues
until a termination criterion is met. The initial assignment of cluster means
greatly affects the final clustering results, a detailed study is given in[4]. In
our algorithm, we assume the initial assignment is done randomly, as in[24].
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the privacy preserving k-means
clustering algorithm.
The algorithm that we present in this paper terminates when there is
no change in the assignment of clusters. The algorithm presented in [24]
terminates when the change in cluster means between two iterations is less
than a given threshold. Our termination criterion corresponds to setting the
threshold to 0, which means the algorithm will terminate when there is no
change in the cluster assignments.
Another factor to be considered is the distance measure used. For sim-
plicity we use Euclidean distance, though our algorithm will work with every
Minkowski distance. When we compare our work to the work of [24], we use
Euclidean distance in their algorithm as well.
Since the data is vertically partitioned, each party can compute part of
the distances between each of the n entities in the dataset and the cluster
means. Since we use Euclidean distance the square of the total distance
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Algorithm 1 Privacy Preserving k-means algorithm
do in parallel for each party i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
for each cluster c← 1, . . . , k do
initialize µci randomly
end for
end parallel
repeat
for each entity j ← 1, . . . , n do
Cluster[j] ← SecurelyComputeClosestCluster(j)
end for
do in parallel for each party i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
for each cluster c← 1, . . . , k do
µci ← mean of party i’s attributes in cluster c
end for
end parallel
until termination criteria met
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between an entity and a cluster mean is the sum of the squares of the sub-
distances computed at the subspaces of each party:
‖xi − µc‖2 =
r∑
p=1
‖xip − µcp‖2. (1)
However, the parties cannot reveal their sub-distances in order to compute
the sum of them, since the local sub-distances may contain private infor-
mation. We therefore need to compute and compare the distances securely
without revealing the individual sub-distances. This is done in the “Secure-
lyComputeClosestCluster” algorithm, which we will describe in the next sub-
section. It is in the secure computation of closest clusters that our algorithm
varies from that of [24].
4.1.2 Secure Closest Cluster Computation
To compute the closest cluster mean for a given entity in the database we
have to securely sum the sub-distances computed by each party and compare
the results so that nothing other than the comparison result is learned. With
n entities, the algorithm has to be invoked nt times, where t is the number
of iterations in the standard k-means algorithm. In this section, we describe
the algorithm for securely finding the cluster mean which is closest to a given
entity.
The security of our algorithm relies on three ideas:
• Each party sends secret shares its sub-distance to all the other parties,
and the sum of the sub-distances is computed on the secret shares.
• The comparison of distances is performed on secret shares so that only
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the comparison result is learned. The actual values of the distances are
not learned.
• The ordering of clusters is permuted so that for each entity in the
database, only the index of the closest cluster is learned. Relative
orderings of the entity’s distances to each cluster mean µc cannot be
learned. This is very simple when we work with secret shares, but in
[24] this is the step that requires the highest amount of communication
and computation since they rely heavily on public key encryptions.
The most important difference between our work and the work of Clifton
and Vaidya is the secure computation of the closest cluster. In [24] the first
party selects “disguising values” for each pair of cluster and party such that
the sum of all disguising values corresponding to one cluster is zero. Then, the
first party together with all other parties compute the encryption of the sub-
distances plus the corresponding disguising value. Afterwards, the encrypted
distances are permuted by the second party. Finally, the first party decrypts
the distances, finds the minimal distance, and reveals the identity of the
closest cluster with the help from party 2. The closest cluster corresponds
to the new cluster assignment of the given entity. In contrast to Clifton
and Vaidya, we use additive secret sharing, which allows us to compute all
distances by locally adding up the correct shares. Our algorithm for securely
computing the closest cluster mean for each entity has three phases. Pseudo
code of these three phases are in Algorithm 2.
Phase 1: In the first phase of the secure closest cluster computation
algorithm each party secret shares its sub-distance for each cluster mean
with every other party. Let Xic be the ith sub-distance between the entity
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Algorithm 2 Secure Closest Cluster Computation
Require: entity e, cluster means µ1, . . . , µk
Ensure: Closest cluster to e
do in parallel for each party i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
for each cluster c← 1, . . . , k do
Phase 1 :
Xic ← local component of the distance from e to cluster mean µc
for every other party j do
αij ← random number
send αij to party j
end for
αii ← Xic −
∑
j 6=i αij
Phase 2 :
Tic =
∑
j αji
send Tic to party r (Party 1 does not send anything!)
end for
end parallel
Phase 3 : (Phase 3 only involves parties 1, 2, 3 and r)
do in parallel for parties i = 1, r
for each cluster c← 1, . . . , k do
Party 1: D1c ← T1c
Party r: Drc ←
∑r
i=2 Tic
end for
(D′i1, . . . , D
′
ik)←SecurePermute(Di1, . . . , Dik)
end parallel
return SecureFindMinimum(D′i1, . . . , D
′
ik)
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that is being evaluated and the cluster mean c. Each party (i) creates a
random number αcij for every other party, and sends α
c
ij to party j for all
c ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The ith party keeps αcii = Xic −
∑
j 6=i α
c
ij to himself. Note
that Xic cannot be computed unless all parties come together to recover it.
Phase 2: After the completion of Phase 1, for every cluster c, we let Tic
denote party i’s secret share of the distance between the given entity and
cluster mean c (Tic =
∑r
j=1 α
c
ji).
Since all αcij, i 6= j, are random numbers, Tic is also a random number, so
nothing can be learned from it. Every party, apart from the first party, now
sends Tic to the rth party.
Phase 3: This phase only involves parties 1, 2, 3 and r. Party r adds
the values Tic to compute Drc =
∑r
i=2 Tic. Party one defines D1c = T1c. The
distance between the given entity and cluster mean c is now Dc = D1c+Drc.
Since party 1 did not send T1c, party r cannot learn the distance. The task of
party 1 and r is now to find the minimum element from the list (D1, . . . , Dk),
where party 1 knows D1c, and party r knows Drc of each element. This is
done by comparing each of the elements with the current smallest element
one by one. The comparison presents two problems:
1. How do parties 1 and r compare two numbers Dc = D1c + Drc and
Dc′ = D1c′ +Drc′ such that neither of them will learn the values of Dc
and Dc′?
2. How do we prevent parties 1 and r from learning the ordering of all the
distances? They should only learn the minimum distance?
The first problem is solved by observing that Dc < Dc′ if and only if
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D1c−D1c′ < Drc′−Drc. Party 1 knows the left hand side, and party r knows
the right hand side. They can now compute the result of the comparison by
applying the so called “Yao’s millionaires problem”. We will describe this in
detail in Sec. 4.1.4.
To solve the second problem above, parties 1 and r permute the order of
the elements in the vector (D1, . . . , Dk) with the help of party 2 and party
3. We discuss this further in Sec. 4.1.3 below.
Once Phase 3 is completed parties 1 and r can reveal the index of the
cluster which is closest to the entity being considered.
4.1.3 Secure Permutation
Since parties 1 and r obtain the result of all the comparisons of the distances
from a given entity to all the cluster-means they will not only know which
cluster is closer to the given entity, but also know which cluster is furthest
away, second furthest away and so forth. This clearly gives parties 1 and
r an advantage over the other parties. To prevent parties 1 and r from
obtaining this information, we first make a “secure permutation” of all the
cluster distances. After finding the minimum element in the permuted list
of distances parties 1 and r are only told the true identity of the cluster at
minimum distance.
The secure permutation is the bottleneck for the algorithm by Clifton
and Vaidya since it amounts to more than 90% if the computation time.
The reason being that in their algorithm party 1 has to create kr public-key
encryptions for each entity in the database.
In our algorithm we take advantage of secret sharing to make a consider-
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Party 1 Party r Party 2 Party 3
-(D11, . . . , D1k)
-(Dr1, . . . , Drk)
-ﬀ pi
ﬀ(D1pi(1) + r1, . . . , D1pi(k) + rk)
ﬀ(Drpi(1) − r1, . . . , Drpi(k) − rk)
Figure 1: Secure Permutation Protocol
ably more efficient permutation algorithm. Parties 1 and r need the help of
two other parties, parties 2 and 3, for the permutation. Party 1 simply sends
his secret shares to party 2, and party r sends his secret shares to party 3.
Then parties 2 and 3 agree on a permutation and each of them apply the
permutation to the vector of shares they received. To make sure that parties
1 and r cannot recognize the elements in the vector they get back, party 2
adds a random number ri to element i, while party 3 subtracts ri (recall that
each element of the vectors are additive secret shares of a distance, so adding
and subtracting the same random number will not change the result of the
algorithm). After applying the permutations, they send the vector back to
the parties they got them from. The algorithm can be seen in Fig. 1.
4.1.4 Secure Minimum Element
In the last step of the “Secure Closest Cluster Computation” parties 1 and r
compare the distances between the current entity and all the cluster means.
Each of them has a secret share of the k entries in the permuted vector
of these distances. To find the minimum, they perform k − 1 comparisons
23
with the current minimum element (they do not compare the first distance).
After finding the minimal element, party 1 informs party 2 of the permuted
identity of the closest cluster. Since party 2 knows the permutation, she can
announce the real identity of the closest cluster to all parties.
Clifton and Vaidya[24] suggest using Yao’s circuit evaluation[28] for the
comparisons. They argue that even though Yao’s algorithm is very inefficient,
it may be plausible to use it for the comparison, since they only perform kn
comparisons in each iteration of the k-means algorithm. Nonetheless, in our
experiments, we use an algorithm proposed by Savas¸, Pedersen, and Kaya in
[16] in both our algorithm and our implementation of Clifton and Vaidya’s
algorithm.
In the comparison algorithm of [15, 16], two players who wish to compare
two integers, each create two bitwise secret shares of their own inputs and
send these shares to two semi-honest non-colluding third parties. Two k−bit
integers x, y are compared according to the formula :
x > y ⇐⇒
k∨
i=1
(xi ∧ ¬yi
k∧
j=i+1
(xj ⊕ yj)) (2)
The algorithm utilizes the fact that additive secret sharing is homomorphic
with respect to addition, thus bitwise additive secret sharing is homomorphic
with respect to bitwise addition, XOR operation of bits. The algorithm
of [16], like Fischlin’s algorithm[10], uses a trick by Sander, Yung, Young
[23] to convert XOR homomorphic secret sharing into AND homomorphic
secret sharing without disclosing the secret. For the proofs of correctness
and security, the readers are referred to [16].
We have modified the algorithm from [16] slightly, by observing that the
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two semi-honest third parties are actually not needed in the algorithm. In
the original algorithm, the parties involved in secure comparison secret-share
their inputs with 2 semi-honest third parties, sending one share to a third
party and the remaining share to the other third party. This is equivalent to
each party secret-sharing their inputs among themselves; each party sends a
secret share of its input to the other party while keeping the remaining se-
cret share to itself. Therefore, in our algorithm, the parties who are involved
in the secure comparison (parties 1 and r) apply the algorithm in [16] by
secret-sharing their inputs among themselves. In the original algorithm[16],
two third parties end up with secret shares of a binary vector. The vector
is as long as the inputs that are compared. If the first input to the compar-
ison is greater than the other, then the vector has exactly one 1-bit at the
first position where the first input is greater than the second input. Since
the position of the 1-bit gives information about the relative difference be-
tween these two inputs, the two third parties agree on a permutation and
permute the vector before it is sent to the party who will learn the result
of the comparison. In our algorithm, parties 1 and r do not perform the
permutation themselves since they are the ones that will learn the result of
the comparison. Instead, we use the permutation algorithm described above
in Sec. 4.1.3.
4.2 Other Clustering Methods
In this section, we show that our privacy preserving clustering scheme can
be applied to any clustering algorithm that takes a dissimilarity matrix as an
input, such as k-medoids and agglomerative hierarchical clustering(AGNES).
25
Pieces of our k-means algorithm, with little modification can be also used to
compute a dissimilarity matrix of entities in the dataset.
Suppose there are n entities in the dataset. A dissimilarity matrix D is an
N×N matrix, with one entry in the dissimilarity matrix, D[a][b], corresponds
to the distance between entities a and b in the dataset. Since the data is
vertically partitioned, each party can compute part of the distances between
the entity a and b in the dataset. Then, just as in our k-means algorithm
each party will secret share its calculated subdistance with every other party.
If this step is repeated for all the a, b entity pairs, then each party will have
a N × N matrix D, with D[a][b] containing a secret share of the distance
between the points a and b. It can easily be seen that this step is exactly the
same as step 1 of the algorithm “FindClosestCluster” given in section 4.1.2.
Once this dissimilarity matrix computation step is completed, it can be
given as input to a dissimilarity matrix based clustering algorithm, such as
AGNES. AGNES algorithm starts with every single entity in the dataset put
into a cluster of its own. Then in bottom up fashion, closest pair of entities
are merged into bigger clusters at every level. With a dissimilarity matrix
given as an input to AGNES, closest pairs of entities and groups can be
easily computed. However, revealing the dissimilarity matrices may cause
some threats to privacy. Therefore we cannot simply sum the matrices each
party holds and give to some party to continue with the AGNES algorithm.
Instead, we can use Secure Comparison protocols we discussed in sections
4.1.4. Suppose we want to find out the whether entity a is closer to the
entity b or entity c, we should compare if D[a][b] < D[a][c], where D is
the global dissimilarity matrix. Like step 2 in our “FindClosestCluster”
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algorithm, every party apart from P1 will send Di[a][b] and Di[a][c] values to
Pr, where Di[a][b] and Di[a][c] are secret shares of D[a][b] and D[a][c] party
i has. Afterwards, P1 and Pr can privately compute D[a][b] < D[a][c] and
reveal the result to every other party.
4.3 Privacy Preserving Trajectory Clustering
Our k-means clustering algorithm can be applied to trajectories without any
change, if trajectories are optimally aligned. Consider two trajectories TA
and TB. Let points on TA be (xi, yi) and (pi, qi). The distance between
their positions ,d, on time i will be di =
√
(xi − pi)2 + (yi − qi)2 if we use
Euclidean distance or di = (xi− pi)+ (yi− qi) if we use Manhattan distance.
The total distance between TA and TB will be sum of di values. If Euclidean
or Manhattan distance measures are used, our algorithm can be directly
applied to trajectories as if it was ordinary numerical data.
4.3.1 Spatially Shifted Trajectories
Two trajectories can be very similar except for a small constant spatial shift.
Then Euclidean distance or Manhattan distance may fail to realize the close-
ness of these two trajectories. The figure 2 shows two trajectories with a
spatial shift between them.
Needham and Boyle[21] propose a metric for handling two such trajecto-
ries. They propose that the optimal shift,δ, between two trajectories TA and
TB can be calculated by the formula :
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Figure 2: Spatially shifted trajectories
δ = µ(di) =
1
n
∑
i
di (3)
The new distance between the trajectories can be calculated as Euclidean
distance between TB and TA with all points of Ta shifted by δ. Since the
data is vertically partitioned, every player Pi will be able to compute part
of δi =
1
n
∑
i di on the attributes he owns. δ is equal to sum of δi’s of every
player. Since δi values are private, every player secret share its own δi with
every other player. This step is the same as step 1 of the algorithm 2, now
every player can sum their δi’s and reveal δ .
4.3.2 Temporally Shifted Trajectories
Two trajectories can be very similar except for a small constant time shift
between them. Consider two moving objects, one following the same trajec-
tory of the other, but only after some time. Euclidean distance may not be
able to classify these two trajectories as similar trajectories. Figure 3 shows
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two such trajectories.
Figure 3: Two temporally shifted trajectories
Needham and Boyle[21] propose a metric for handling two such trajecto-
ries. The optimal time shift j between two trajectories TA and TB can be
calculated by the formula
j = arg mink(
1
n− k
∑
i
|(xi+k, yi+k)− (pi, qi)|). (4)
Since the data is vertically partitioned (xi+k, yi+k) and (pi, qi) could be
held by different players. In such case, the players secret share their points
with each other. Suppose player a holds (pi, qi) points and player b holds
(xi+k, yi+k) and they want to compute. To compute xi+k − pi, player b sends
a random number rb to player a, his share becomes xi+k−rb. Player a sends a
random number ra to player b, his share becomes pi− ra. Player b calculates
xi+k − rb − ra.
Player a calculates
rb − (pi − ra).
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If player a and b add their shares, they will get xi+k − pi. At the end the
each player will have a secret share of 1
n−k
∑
i |(xi+k, yi+k)− (pi, qi)|. Using
the Secure Minimum Element described in section 4.1.4, they can compute
the minimum k without anyone learning other’s input. Once the time shift
j is known, the distance between TB and the shifted trajectory TA, j is cal-
culated.
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5 Privacy Discussion
In this section, we show why our algorithm preserves privacy(sec 5.1) and
compare the security of our algorithm with that of Clifton and Vaidya[24](sec
5.2). Before going into the discussion about privacy, we have to define what
we mean by private information in the algorithm. Above we set as our goal
that the only information party i will learn after the algorithm is:
• The final mean µci for each cluster c ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
• The cluster index for each entity j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
No information other than these two should be learned out of algorithm. The
actual values of data attributes belonging to the data holders are obviously
private information. Since these values are not shared among data holders
during the execution of our algorithm, we may say that these values are kept
private. Portions of distances(Xic values) calculated by each party according
to their set of attributes are also deemed private information since one may
recover the actual values of the entities by knowing the distances of the
entities to the cluster means.
5.1 Privacy in our algorithm
In order to examine how our method protects privacy, we focus on the “Se-
curely Computing the Closest Cluster” algorithm which is the only part of
the algorithm in which there are interactions among the parties. In Phase
1 of the algorithm, all parties secret-share their local distance values with
the other parties. Since each party keeps one share for himself and since all
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shares are needed to recover the local distances, no information will leak even
if all the remaining r − 1 parties collude.
In Phase 2 of the algorithm all parties send their Tij values to party r.
Since Tij are secret-shares of the total distance (it is the sum of the secret-
shares of the local distances) and since party 1 does not send T1j to party r,
parties 1 and r cannot gain any information unless they collude. Notice that
T1j contains shares from all other parties’ local distance components.
Phase 3 of the algorithm consists of the permutation and secure com-
parison sub-phases. In the permutation phase parties 1 and r send their
secret shares of the distance to parties 2 and 3 respectively. Now parties
2 and 3 are in the same situation as parties 1 and r were after Phase 2.
Collusion between parties 2 and 3 allow them to learn an entity’s distance
to each cluster mean, therefore the permutation phase is privacy-preserving
under the assumption that parties 2 and 3 are non-colluding. The secure
comparison is privacy-preserving under the assumption that parties 1 and r
are non-colluding; detailed proof is explained in [16].
Finally the “Securely Computing the Closest Cluster” algorithm returns
the closest cluster to the given entity. Clearly this is exactly what the par-
ties are supposed to learn in the last round. However, all parties will see
how entities change cluster in each iteration of the k-means clustering al-
gorithm. An entity, which fluctuates between two clusters, can be assumed
to be approximately half-way between the two cluster means. This is more
information than is strictly allowed. However, since the data holders need
to learn intermediate results to compute the new means, mitigation of this
problem is extremely difficult if not impossible.
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5.2 Security Comparison
In both our algorithm and the algorithm by Clifton and Vaidya [24], privacy
breaches may occur when two or more parties collude. Therefore, in both of
the algorithms, some non-collusion assumptions have to be made for some
specific parties. However, the gained information in Clifton’s and Vaidya’s
algorithm as a result of collusion is much more severe. In the algorithm by
Clifton and Vaidya, each party, upon computing local distances Xic, sends
Xic to party 1. Party 1 adds random values αic to Xic of each party. After
this phase, each party sends Xic + αic to party r. Here, collusion between
parties 1 and r allows them to learn the value ofXic of all other parties, which
is no doubt a severe privacy breach. In our algorithm such a privacy breach
is mitigated by the use of secret sharing. Each party secret-shares Xic with
every other party, so the value of Xic can be recovered only if all parties come
together. As a solution to this problem, Clifton and Vaidya[24] propose an
extension to their algorithm that increases the number of colluding parties
needed to reveal Xic of each party. In essence, they apply their permutation
steps more than once according to a chosen anti-collusion parameter. If this
parameter is denoted as p, they repeat the permutation algorithm p − 1
times by choosing a different party at each time to play the role of party 1.
This method increases security of the algorithm; however, it also increases
computation and communication cost considerably.
In our algorithm, we have non-collusion assumptions for parties 1, 2, 3
and r. If the permuter parties (parties 2 or 3) collude, they can reveal each
entity’s distance to each cluster mean µc. Also, if parties 1, r and one of the
permuter parties(2 or 3) collude, they can reveal each entity’s distance to each
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cluster mean µc. We can say that collusion between 2 specific parties(parties
2 and 3) leads to a privacy breach in our algorithm in the worst case. We
can also do the same trick as in the algorithm of [24] and increase the non-
collusion threshold by applying the permutation algorithm more than once,
at each iteration picking different two parties to play the roles of party 2
and 3. Since our permutation algorithm does not contain any encryption
or similar expensive operations, it can be applied more than once without
bringing too much computation and communication overhead.
The comparison of the security of the two algorithms reveal that collusion
between 2 specific parties leads to some privacy breach in both algorithms.
However, in [24] the leaked information is more severe in case of a collusion.
Some information specific to a party (Xic for party i) can be learned in [24],
whereas in our algorithm leaked information is global information, not bound
to a specific party.
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6 Cost Analysis
A privacy preserving distributed data mining algorithm aiming to be used in
real life applications should not bring too much communication and compu-
tation overhead. In the following two subsections we analyze the communi-
cation and computation overheads of our algorithm. The overheads mainly
occur in the “Securely Finding the Closest Cluster” part of the algorithm.
Thus, we only analyze this portion of our algorithm. It should be noted that
both communication and computation overheads of the k-means clustering
algorithm depend on the dataset. The number of iterations required before
the termination criteria is met depends on the data and the initial cluster
means. Therefore, in the communication and computation cost analysis, we
only consider one iteration of the k-means algorithm. We let r be the num-
ber of parties, n the number of entities in the database and k the number of
clusters.
6.1 Communication Cost Analysis
Most of the communication overhead in our algorithm is created in Phase 1
of the “Securely Finding the Closest Cluster” algorithm. In this phase, for
each entity, one party sends secret shares of its portion of the distance to
every other party for each of the k clusters. This is equal to sending each
party a vector of length k. Each entry of this vector is a secret share of 32
bits. Since there are r parties and each of them send a shared secret vector
of length k to every other party, the communication cost of this step of our
algorithm is 32r(r − 1)kn bits. Therefore, Phase 1 of our algorithm has a
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communication complexity of θ(r2kn).
In the original work of Clifton and Vaidya[24], every party sends its local
distance value encrypted to party 1. Party 1 adds random values to these
local distance values by using the additive homomorphic property of the
public key encryption scheme used, and sends the distorted values back to
each data holder. Assuming that a public key encryption scheme with 1024
bits of key and block size is used, which is the minimum for security purposes,
the communication cost of this phase in the work of Clifton and Vaidya is
2(r − 1)1024kn = 2048(r − 1)kn bits. This phase of Clifton and Vaidya’s
algorithm has a communication complexity of θ(nrk)
Phase 2 of our algorithm is very similar to Clifton and Vaidya’s algorithm
in terms of communication cost, each party apart from party 1 will send a
32 bit integer to the rth party, therefore the communication costs here are
the same, 32n(r − 2)k bits, giving a complexity of θ(nrk).
In Phase 3 of the algorithm we run an algorithm for Yao’s Millionaires
problem which gives us very little communication overhead. The only com-
munication is one call to the permutation algorithm in each call to the com-
parison algorithm. The vectors permuted are of length 32λ, where λ is a
security parameter given to the comparison algorithm. Typical values for λ
are around 50. We have applied the same comparison algorithm in our im-
plementation of the algorithm by Clifton and Vaidya, so the two algorithms
have the same communication overhead in this step. This step is always
executed between 2 parties, therefore complexity of this step is θ(nk)
In total, our algorithm has a complexity of θ(nr2k) + θ(nrk) + θ(rk) =
θ(nr2k). Communication complexity of our algorithm is quadratic with the
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number of parties. On the other hand, Clifton’s[24] algorithm has a total
communication complexity of θ(nrk) + θ(nrk) + θ(nk) = θ(nrk), linear with
the number of parties.
Although our algorithm has a higher communication complexity(quadratic
vs linear), from the above analysis we observe that for values of r up to
2048/32 = 64, our algorithm has smaller communication cost in phase 1 as
compared to the work of Clifton and Vaidya[24](when using 1024-bit encryp-
tion in [24]). We confirm this bound in our experiments in Section 6.3.
6.2 Computation Cost Analysis
The computational complexity of our algorithm is θ(rnk) for each party
involved in the algorithm. In Clifton’s algorithm one party has the computa-
tional complexity of θ(nrk) whereas all the other parties have the computa-
tional complexity of θ(nk) However, in terms of computation overhead, our
algorithm is more efficient than the algorithm of Clifton and Vaidya. Since
we use secret sharing rather than encryption, our algorithm uses primitive
operations only. However, the algorithm of Clifton and Vaidya uses public
key encryptions which requires expensive modular exponentiation operations
on very large numbers. In Phase 1 of Clifton and Vaidya’s algorithm two pub-
lic key encryptions and one public key decryption are needed for every entity
and cluster pair. In total, 3nk modular exponentiations are needed in Clifton
and Vaidya’s algorithm. Given the primitive nature of the operations in our
algorithm, our algorithm gives much lower computation overhead, which is
confirmed by our experiments in Section 6.3.
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6.3 Experimental Results
We implemented our algorithm and the algorithm of Clifton and Vaidya[24]
and performed tests on them in order to validate the theoretical findings for
both communication and computation costs given in Section 6.For testing
purposes, we used two spatio-temporal datasets, consisting of moving object
trajectories in the city of Milan. The datasets were provided to us by our
GeoPKDD, 6th Framework EU project, partners. One dataset has 150 tra-
jectories while the second one has 600. The number of measurement points
for each trajectory is over 1050. Since each measurement consists of one
x and one y coordinate, each item in the dataset has over 2100 attributes.
For both of the datasets, the attributes are partitioned among the parties
evenly; that is, every party has equal or near equal number of attributes.
However, the distribution of attributes does not affect neither of the two
algorithms considerably (since the first step of each iteration is to compute
local distances).
It is important to note that the initial cluster assignments of entities
greatly affects the execution time of the k-means clustering algorithm. In
order to make a fair comparison, we make sure that initial cluster assignments
of the entities in the datasets are the same for each test for both of the
protocols.
We made distributed implementations of both of the algorithms, with
each data holder in both of the algorithms running as a separate process.
Communication between processes is done with Message Passing Interface(MPI).
The implementations are done in the C#.NET programming language and
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the as an MPI library we used MPI.NET1, developed by Indiana University.
In the implementation of the protocol in [24], we use the Paillier[22] public
key encryption scheme with 2048 bit cipher texts.
We have performed two tests with each of the datasets. First test is to see
how much communication overhead our protocol brings and how the commu-
nication overhead in our protocol compares to communication overhead in
the protocol of Clifton and Vaidya[24]. The total amounts of transmissions
caused by the protocols with respect to the number of parties are depicted
in Figures 4 and 5 for two different datasets.
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Figure 4: Communication cost(1st dataset)
1http://www.osl.iu.edu/research/mpi.net/
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Figure 5: Communication cost(2nd dataset)
As can be seen from these figures, our protocol has lower communication
cost. In the analysis section(6.1), we expected that our algorithm should
have a lower communication cost up to a threshold. If 1024 bit encryption
was used in the implementation of [24], this threshold was expected to be 64.
Since we use Paillier encryption, which creates 2048 bit cypher texts, this
threshold is higher in our figures.
The second test that we have performed is to analyze and compare the
computational overheads brought by our protocol and the protocol of Clifton
and Vaidya[24]. Execution times of the protocols with respect to the number
of parties are shown in Figures 6 and 7 for the two datasets.
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Figure 6: Computation cost(1st dataset)
The execution times of our protocol are always less than 400 seconds,for
the 1st dataset and 2000 seconds for the second dataset. whereas the exe-
cution times of [24] are thousands of seconds. The reason of this significant
performance difference lies in the use of public key cryptography. In order
to compare each entity to each cluster mean, Clifton and Vaidya[24] have
to perform expensive public key encryptions and decryptions linear in the
number of parties. In our protocol, however, we do not rely on such com-
putationally expensive public key operations. Although our algorithm has a
θ(n2) complexity, the most time consuming part in our algorithm is phase 3
of the algorithm 2. That phase is always run by 2 parties, that is the reason
41
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of Parties
Our Algorithm
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Ti
m
e
(s
e
cs
)
Number of Parties
Computational Cost
Our Algorithm
Clifton's Algorithm
Figure 7: Computation cost(2nd dataset)
the figures do not show linear growth.
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7 Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied the problem of distributed privacy preserving clus-
tering over vertically partitioned data. We proposed algorithms for dis-
tributed k-means clustering algorithm and distributed dissimilarity matrix
computation, which can be given as input to clustering algorithms such as
AGNES or k-medoids. We also showed that although our algorithms are for
generic numeric data, it can also handle some special properties of spatio-
temporal data, i.e. moving object trajectories.
Our k-means clustering algorithm is an improvement of the work by
Clifton and Vaidya[24]. By replacing computationally expensive public key
encryptions with secret sharing, we showed that most of the communication
and computation overhead can be avoided. Although our algorithm show
worse asymptotic behavior than the work in [24], a more detailed analysis
and experimental results show that our algorithm has a much better com-
munication and computation overhead up to a reasonable amount of parties.
Secret sharing based privacy preserving data mining algorithms not only
helps us archive better computation and communication overhead, but also
provide better security as well. By using secret sharing, we were able to get
rid of non-collusion assumptions among involved parties, or at least minimize
the value information gained by colluding parties.
We believe concerns about user privacy will increase in the foreseeable fu-
ture, developing new privacy preserving data mining algorithms or improving
existing ones will still be an important research problem. Only secure mul-
tiparty computation provides “true” privacy among data mining algorithms.
In this thesis we showed that SMC based privacy preserving data mining
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algorithms do not have to suffer from high overheads, making them posses
good practical value.
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